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— PRODUCING LOCALIZED COMMODITY 
FRONTIERS AT THE END OF CHEAP NATURE: 
An Analysis of Eco-scalar Carbon Fixes and their 
Consequences
Seth Schindler and J. Miguel Kanai
Abstract
There is no single ‘great’ commodity frontier whose exploitation under current 
socio-technical conditions could fuel capital accumulation at the global scale. According 
to Jason Moore, this represents the ‘end of Cheap Nature’ and signals a terminal crisis for 
capitalism as we know it. In this article we complicate this assertion by showing how, in the 
context of global environmental governance frameworks of carbon control, a diverse range 
of actors situated at multiple scales are intensifying the use of cities and their hinterlands 
for the production/transgression of localized commodity frontiers. We draw on scholarship 
on uneven geographical development, state-led restructuring and eco-scalar ixes to present 
two case studies from diferent segments of the carbon cycle in the global South. The irst 
case demonstrates how the introduction of waste-to-energy technology in Delhi facilitated 
the generation of ‘carbon credits’ while waste matter itself became a commodity. The 
second discusses attempts by the Brazilian state of Amazonas (Amazônia) aspiring to shift 
from rainforest exploitation to inancialized conservation supported by the ‘green global 
city’ functions of metropolitan Manaus. These cases demonstrate that although the global 
carbon-control regime may enable accumulation, implementation remains speculative, and 
localized commodity frontiers provoke social resistances that jeopardize their durability.
Introduction
Prospects of unlimited economic growth, such as those promised by the 
‘commodities boom’, the sustainable ‘green economy’, the ‘new economy’ and global 
technological revolution, have given way to a vista of unyielding crises that threaten to 
extend well into the twenty-first century. Most significantly these include global 
capitalism’s prolonged malaise, whose most recent avatar was the 2008 financial crisis, 
and the looming ecological collapse brought on by global warming and overexploitation 
of the biosphere. According to Jason Moore (2011: 2) these economic and ecological 
crises constitute a single crisis: ‘Capitalism does not have an ecological regime; it is an 
ecological regime’ (Moore, 2015: 2, original emphasis). Much more than a mode of 
production, capitalism is ‘a way of organizing nature’ (ibid., original emphasis; see also 
Moore, 2011). The transgression of successive commodity frontiers underpins the 
expansion of capitalism by facilitating the appropriation of hitherto non-commodified 
resources. As resources are absorbed into circuits of capital, they become commodified, 
but, as Moore points out: ‘Every act of exploitation (of commodified labor-power) 
therefore depends on an even greater act of appropriation (of unpaid work/energy)’ 
(Moore, 2015: 54, bracketed text in original). He argues that if the ratio of appropriated 
resources declines in relation to those that are commodified, capital is subjected to a 
falling rate of profit. In response, new frontiers––either geographical or technological––
must be identified and transgressed to re-establish access to unpaid work/energy and 
avert a crisis of overaccumulation. This explains why capitalism cannot ‘sustain itself as 
a closed system’ (Moore, 2000: 146) and must constantly expand.
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Moore maps his conceptualization of capitalism onto longue durée historical 
analyses (2000; 2015) and shows that the rise and fall of what Giovanni Arrighi (1996: 4) 
calls ‘systemic cycles of accumulation’ in the ‘long’ twentieth century were determined 
by their (in)ability to maintain the production and availability of cheap resources. 
Moore’s analysis is scaled to the world-ecological system with a historical depth that 
allows him to convincingly make the following two proposals: irst, capital accumulation 
has always required an ecological surplus, or what he calls ‘Cheap Nature’, and secondly, 
current modes of organizing nature cannot be counted on to generate such a surplus. 
Herein lie the roots of the current crisis: there are simply no reservoirs of untapped 
resources whose appropriation under contemporary socio-technical conditions could 
fuel an expansionary phase of capital accumulation at the global scale. According to 
Moore the ‘end of Cheap Nature’ is an insurmountable limit to capital accumulation, and 
this leads him to interpret the current crisis as terminal.
We do not take issue with the broad contours of Moore’s analysis in this article. 
However, we are in agreement with Böhm et al.’s (2012) assertion that, irst, even though 
Moore’s analysis is informed by questions of geographically uneven development, he 
undertheorizes the contemporary geographical restructuring of regimes of accumulation 
(ibid.: 1627) and, secondly, the conceptualization of the end of Cheap Nature needs to 
engage the carbon economy more explicitly. Thus we seek to enrich Moore’s analysis 
of capitalism as an ecological regime by ofering an analysis of the state-led territorial 
restructuring that is taking place at the current conjuncture of world capitalism in crisis. 
Speciically, we argue that in the absence of a single ‘great frontier’, eforts to locate and 
appropriate Cheap Nature have not ceased. On the contrary, as a ‘global ecological ix’ 
appears increasingly unrealizable, multi-scalar growth coalitions are developing new 
repertoires to identify, produce and transgress localized commodity frontiers in and 
around cities. The goal of these coalitions is to produce and sustain strategic spaces of 
accumulation under more exacting economic and ecological constraints, and specialized 
territorial economies are the means. This explains why city-regions are becoming 
the key scale at which capital is territorialized, ixed and accumulated through novel 
(re-)conigurations of relations among locally, nationally and globally situated actors 
(see Torrance, 2008; Bayirbağ, 2010; Kirkpatrick and Smith, 2011; Nugent, 2015; Loftus 
and March, 2016; Schindler, 2016). These regimes increasingly represent forms of 
ecologically oriented urban entrepreneurialism whose ‘spatial reorganization [is] 
justiied on environmental grounds to address economic crises’ (Cohen and Bakker, 
2014: 142). Thus our focus on the urban manifestations of the relationship between 
carbon control and localized commodity frontiers contributes to a growing body of 
scholarship on the proliferation, modalities and consequences of eco-scalar and socio-
ecological ixes (Cohen and Bakker, 2014; McCarthy, 2015; Ekers and Prudham, 2017).
This article presents two case studies of global carbon-control frameworks that 
inform city-based eco-scalar ixes. Whereas city-centred carbon-control regimes in the 
US and Europe have come under intense scholarly scrutiny (Jonas et al., 2011), scholars 
who focused on Southern urbanism have tended to research cities’ eforts to adapt to 
climate change (Parnell et al., 2007; Fuchs et al., 2011; Carmin et al., 2012). Further 
analysis of mitigation strategies and initiatives is particularly crucial in ‘emerging 
economies’ such as those of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), which have embraced and promoted the global expansion of carbon markets 
(Böhm et al., 2012: 1628). We bring together two case studies that we have researched 
separately over extended periods (Schindler et al., 2012; Kanai, 2014a; 2014b; Kanai and 
da Silva Oliveira, 2014; Schindler and Kishore, 2015; Demaria and Schindler, 2016; Kanai, 
2016), which illustrate how efforts to produce and transgress localized commodity 
frontiers unfold in cities in the global South and their hinterlands. Both cases are 
informed by a logic of carbon control and concomitant global governance frameworks. 
Moreover, these cases are situated at diferent segments of the carbon cycle, yet in each 
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instance ‘fundamentally new ways of ordering the relations between humans and the 
rest of nature’ (Moore, 2015: 127) facilitate the appropriation of unpaid (nature’s) work.
In the irst case we narrate the introduction of waste-to-energy incinerators in 
Delhi, India, as the cornerstone of Delhi’s municipal solid waste-management strategy. 
This was designed to foster the accumulation of capital by generating cheap electricity 
as well as Certiied Emissions Reductions––called ‘carbon credits’ under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)––for the projects’ local proponents. In the second case we show how 
the Brazilian state of Amazonas sought to restructure the region’s model of territorial 
development, shifting from a logic of rainforest resource extraction to inancialized 
conservation predicated on the commodiication of carbon stored in standing forests. 
Various payments for ecosystem services and carbon-control schemes have been 
introduced with difering degrees of success. Instead of reducing Amazonas’ extreme 
territorial unevenness, these new development strategies have augmented the relative 
importance of metropolitan Manaus, which is increasingly promoted as a ‘green global 
city’ or advanced urban economy specialized in the production, consumption and 
trading of ecosystem-based commodities and services. Both cases demonstrate that 
eco-scalar ixes may be able to facilitate capital accumulation in strategic city-regions. 
However, they also raise questions surrounding the durability of such strategies, given 
the unpropitious prospect that global ‘capitalism might be able to decarbonize and 
“green” itself, efecting a dramatic transformation of its own business practices’ (Böhm 
et al., 2012: 1633). Thus these initiatives may ultimately become examples of ‘green’ 
varieties of inancialized neoliberalism which, according to Moore (2015: 304–305), seek 
to ‘colonize time’ by postponing crises in the short term rather than achieving a grand 
‘ix’. Indeed, these regimes have encountered major diiculties to continuously expand 
the scale and scope of the appropriation of resources, such as various forms of social 
resistance to the violence and dispossessions that they require.
This article proceeds in three further sections. In the next section we review 
Moore’s framework in depth; then we advance the argument that eco-scalar fixes 
pursued by novel multi-scalar governance regimes are producing commodity frontiers 
and fuelling cycles of accumulation in and around cities. To substantiate this assertion, 
the following section develops case studies on global carbon-control initiatives in 
Delhi and Manaus, respectively. In our concluding remarks we make two related 
points. First, we argue that attempts to localize the appropriation of resources provoke 
environmental justice conlicts, which threaten the durability of multi-scalar growth 
coalitions. Secondly, we note that eco-scalar ixes are not the only way in which localized 
commodity frontiers are produced, and we propose a research agenda.
Spatializing the ‘end of Cheap Nature’
In this section we irst introduce Jason Moore’s expansive understanding of 
capitalism as a world-ecological regime. Secondly, we seek to develop its geographical 
imagination by enriching it with scholarship on uneven development, and scalar, eco-
scalar and socio-ecological ixes. In particular, we focus on how these ixes pertain to 
the implementation of emerging global carbon-control frameworks. We conclude the 
section by advancing the argument that the end of Cheap Nature indeed represents a 
major limit to capital accumulation and, in response, multi-scalar growth coalitions 
are intensifying eforts to restore conditions that are favourable to accumulation by 
producing and transgressing localized commodity frontiers in city-regions.
Jason Moore seeks to suture the chasm between society and nature inherent in 
Cartesian thinking––and social theory tout court––by proposing a socio-ecological theory 
of capitalism. Rather than a social system that has an adverse impact on an external and 
discrete environment, he conceptualizes capitalism as a set of socio-ecological relations 
underpinned by the appropriation of ‘unpaid work/energy of humans and the rest of nature 
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outside the commodity system’ (Moore, 2015: 54). According to Moore the exploitation of 
commodiied waged labour (Marx, [1867] 1990) and the appropriation of women’s unpaid 
reproductive labour (Federici, 2014) is only part of the story. The expansion of capitalism 
also necessitates the appropriation of the unpaid work of nature. Accordingly, the ‘law of 
value in capitalism is a law of Cheap Nature’, which has historically been ‘produced when 
the interlocking agencies of capital, science, and empire’ have forced open commodity 
frontiers (Moore, 2015: 53). Historically, Cheap Nature was appropriated from its users 
and stewards, who were dispossessed, enslaved or even exterminated. However, capital 
accumulation fuelled by the appropriation of Cheap Nature atrophies over time as the 
ratio of commodiied resources increases vis-à-vis those that are appropriated. Once 
resources are commodiied, their owners must bear the cost of nature’s reproduction, and 
the result is a long-term falling proit rate that inhibits capital accumulation.
Moore maps his formulation of ‘capitalism-in-nature’ onto Arrighi’s historical 
analysis of the rise and fall of successive regimes of capitalist accumulation in the ‘long’ 
twentieth century. Arrighi ([1994] 2006) demonstrates that each regime was established 
by a hegemon, from Italian city states to Dutch mercantilists, the British Empire and 
inally America’s petroleum-fuelled global supremacy. In each instance, the hegemon 
established the rules of the game with regard to relations among states and capital in a 
way that facilitated an expansion of global trade and capital accumulation. According to 
Arrighi, the limits that ultimately led to the collapse of each regime were built in from the 
outset, and rival centres of accumulation supplanted the existing hegemon by overcoming 
these contradictions through organizational and technological innovations (ibid.: 226). 
A careful reading of Arrighi indicates that he was not unaware of the importance of the 
‘material expansion’ of the economy and access to resources for the stability and expansion 
of regimes of accumulation. For example, he notes that hegemons ‘identify power with 
the extent of their command over scarce resources and consider territorial acquisitions as 
a means and a by-product of the accumulation of capital’ (ibid.: 33). However, according 
to Moore, capital accumulation is dependent upon the appropriation of resources, not 
merely their control or ownership. His analysis culminates with the provocation that 
by the dawn of the twenty-irst century we had arrived at the ‘end of Cheap Nature’. He 
asserts that there are no remaining commodity frontiers, the transgression of which 
would allow for the appropriation of enough resources to power an expansionary phase 
of growth at the global scale. It follows that the current crisis is terminal.
— Explaining the proliferation of localized commodity frontiers
The end of Cheap Nature may indeed signal a profound crisis, but its 
consequences will unfold unevenly and shape situated urban political ecologies of 
crisis (Lawhon et al., 2014). Neil Smith ([1984] 2010: 153) demonstrated that capitalism 
exhibits the ‘tendency toward the equalization of the conditions of production and of 
the level of development of the productive forces’, while individual capitalists seek 
out cost diferentials in the factors of production. He explains how this contradictory 
tendency fosters uneven development:
[capital] move[s] from developed to underdeveloped space, then back to 
developed space which, because of its interim deprivation of capital, is now 
underdeveloped, and so on. If it can move with suficient alacrity, capital can 
remain one step ahead of the falling rate of proit. To the extent that it can 
realize this geographical seesaw, capital can indeed realize some sort of spatial 
ix (Smith, [1984] 2010: 199).
The circulation of capital accelerates during a crisis as its owners instinctively 
attempt to protect it from devaluation. Their ability to locate price differentials in 
factors of production ‘becomes a means not toward geographical equalization but 
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a differentiation upon which the survival of capital is predicated’ (ibid.: 173). The 
circulation and territorialization of capital is enabled by reworked governance regimes 
comprised of differentially scaled actors. According to Brenner (1998: 461) ‘capital 
necessarily depends upon relatively fixed and immobile territorial infrastructures, 
such as urban-regional agglomerations and territorial states, which are in turn always 
organized upon multiple, intertwined geographical scales’. These stable conigurations 
can enter a state of lux in times of crisis, and their reworking––what Brenner (ibid.) 
calls a ‘scalar ix’––can restore conditions favourable to accumulation. In these cases 
‘forms of territorialization for capital [are] restructured, reterritorialized, and, frequently, 
re-scaled’ (ibid.: 461), thereby identifying or even producing new spaces within which 
capital can be territorialized and accumulated (see Bayirbağ, 2010).
The restructuring of governance regimes increasingly unfolds in the context 
of global governance frameworks. Jurisdictions are redrawn to mirror supposedly 
‘natural’ territories, such as watersheds, with the objective of either internalizing or 
externalizing socio-economic conditions in a given territory (Cohen and Bakker, 2014; 
Cohen and McCarthy, 2015). The demarcation of new territories of environmental 
regulation constitutes an ‘eco-scalar ix’ to Cohen and Bakker (2014: 142) because ‘spatial 
reorganization [is] justiied on environmental grounds to address economic crises’. The 
rescaling of governance regimes is an integral component of attempts to territorialize 
‘socio-ecological ixes’, which rework the ‘ways in which landscapes are produced, how 
human and nonhuman organisms and socio-natural relationships are transformed, and 
how labour processes are restructured in order to address or ofset (at least temporarily) 
entangled social and environmental crises of capitalism through conjoined productions 
of space and nature’ (Ekers and Prudham, 2015: 2438, original emphasis).
Scholars of eco-scalar and socio-ecological fixes have critically examined the 
potential for a societal transition to a sustainable socio-technical regime within a capitalist 
mode of production (Castree and Christophers, 2015; McCarthy, 2015). While Moore’s 
analysis precludes the success of a single ix given the absence of global commodity frontiers, 
there remains a possibility that rescaled governance regimes may be able to locate localized 
commodity frontiers and restore conditions favourable to capital accumulation. One 
pertinent example is that of global environmental governance schemes that impose market-
based incentives designed to simultaneously reduce carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions and 
facilitate capital accumulation. The governance of CO
2
 emissions is ‘fast becoming a 
common denominator for thinking about the organization of social life in relation to the 
environment’ (Bridge, 2011: 821), and the emergent ‘carbon control regime’ (While et al., 
2010) is constituted by global governance frameworks that incentivize the reduction of CO
2
 
emissions by generating what are known as ‘carbon credits’, which are tradable in global 
inancial markets (see Boyd et al., 2011; Bond, 2012). These global frameworks incorporate 
expertise and capital situated at the global scale, as well as city-based stakeholders who 
implement and monitor particular projects. Indeed, cities are ‘irmly on the climate change 
map’ (Bulkeley and Broto, 2012: 1; see also Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006) of these schemes, and 
we argue that many examples of eco-scalar ixes, the objectives of which are to identify and 
produce localized commodity frontiers, are rolled out at the city or regional scale by growth 
coalitions comprised of actors situated at multiple scales.
In summary, the end of Cheap Nature heralds a period of intensiied resource 
extraction, as capital combs over areas it has already incorporated in an attempt to 
locate and appropriate remaining resources. As Moore reminds us:
The conventional view is to think of ecological crisis in terms of diminishing 
lows of substances––not enough food, not enough oil––but it may well be more 
productive to think of crisis as a process through which fundamentally new ways 
of ordering the relations between humans and the rest of nature take shape 
(Moore, 2015: 127).
PRODUCING LOCALIZED COMMODITY FRONTIERS AT THE END OF CHEAP NATURE 833
Global governance frameworks do this by linking expertise and inance situated at the 
global scale with local actors whose situated knowledge serves to identify potential 
commodity frontiers. In contrast to the expansion into a vast ‘great’ frontier, these 
coalitions are acting within territory that has already been incorporated into global 
circuits of capital. The novel multi-scalar growth coalitions that emerge can seek 
to expand a city’s territorial reach over a hinterland from which it secures material 
resources and energy, and/or they can be ‘intensive’ in the sense that they change 
the way humans engage nonhuman nature within cities (for example, through the 
introduction of new technology). This is not a straightforward process of which 
the outcome is assured. On the contrary, the appropriation and commodiication of 
resources is achieved through rounds of dispossession, which are contested and have 
already led to a proliferation of localized environmental justice struggles (Martinez-
Alier et al., 2016).
In the section that follows, we examine two eco-scalar ixes that are focused 
on the supposed reduction of carbon emissions and carbon sequestration, in two very 
diferent cities in the global South. We emphasize the rescaling of governance regimes 
and the common mechanisms whereby localized commodity frontiers are produced and/
or transgressed. Both instances sought to facilitate localized capital accumulation, but 
we argue that this may be short-lived: the ‘ixes’ also induced an urban political ecology 
of inancial speculation and crisis. In the inal section we conclude by suggesting that the 
proliferation of environmental justice conlicts may be attributed to the dispossession 
that is part and parcel of the transgression of localized commodity frontiers, and we 
draw attention to some of the other ways in which they are produced.
Producing and transgressing localized commodity frontiers: Delhi and 
Manaus
This section presents our two case studies. The eco-scalar ixes attempted in 
Delhi and in Manaus highlight the local implementation of global market-based carbon-
control schemes––the CDM and REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation, plus conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks), respectively. They are brought together to 
illustrate the various mechanisms (technological, legal, inancial, territorial) whereby 
multi-scalar growth coalitions attempt to produce and transgress localized commodity 
frontiers amid the global imperative to stabilize a carbon economy. Each case study is 
based on long-term research engagement with both cities, which included working 
closely with local civil-society organizations, interviews with a range of stakeholders 
and extended ield visits.
— Putting waste to work in Delhi, India
Municipal solid waste management in Indian cities is reliant on extensive 
informal-sector networks that facilitate the collection, transportation and processing 
of solid waste. In their analysis of informal waste management in Bholakpur, a 
neighbourhood in Hyderabad, Gidwani and Maringanti (2016) situate municipal solid 
waste management at the ‘back end’ of a commodity frontier whose ‘front end’ extends 
to neighbouring states Odisha, Jharkand and Chattisgargh. The ‘brazenly violent’ 
(ibid.: 113) primitive accumulation in these states’ tribal areas ensures a steady stream 
of resources that sustain the city, and the work of informal-sector waste workers in 
Bholakpur manages the waste that accrues as a result. In this interpretation, informal-
sector waste management enables the extension of a distant commodity frontier. 
Elsewhere in India, however, large-scale formal-sector waste-management enterprises 
have aggressively sought to gain control over lows of municipal solid waste. In Delhi 
the privatization of waste management, coupled with the switch from sanitary landills 
to waste-to-energy incinerators, served to transform waste from an externality into a 
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valuable resource (Schindler et al., 2012). According to Demaria and Schindler (2016: 
309), one consequence has been that ‘the actual places where waste is collected and 
processed (such as doorsteps, transfer stations and landills) have become a “commodity 
frontier” ... and the emergence of a commodity frontier within Delhi indicates that 
we can expect the conflicts surrounding waste to increasingly resemble resource 
conlicts’. This section demonstrates how the approval of two waste-to-energy plants 
by the UN’s CDM––and the subsequent award of ‘carbon credits’––transformed solid 
waste management from the ‘back end’ of a distant commodity frontier to a localized 
commodity frontier centred on the city. Importantly, the previous regime relied on the 
unpaid work of informal-sector waste workers, while the emergent system leverages 
capital-intensive incineration technology to transform solid waste into energy and 
harness the unpaid work of nature.
Waste management in Delhi has always been the responsibility of the municipal 
government––the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (MCD, 1957: Chapter XVII) 
made it the duty of residents to deposit waste in neighbourhood collection depots 
(ibid.: Section 353), where it became the property and responsibility of the state (ibid., 
Section 351). From its inception, the Delhi government embraced landills as a long-
term strategy to deal with waste that accumulated at these neighbourhood depots. 
Delhi’s original master plan (DDA, 1962: 37) noted that landfills were a solution to 
the city’s scarcity of land: ‘Cut up and low lying land may be reclaimed by hygienically 
conducted sanitary earth ills of garbage ... [which] will make available valuable lands 
(which are now waterlogged) for essential urban purposes like parks, etc.’. In the 
intervening years between the irst and second master plans, ‘the environment’ was 
problematized as an object of conservation that requires ‘purposeful transformation’ so 
that Delhi’s inhabitants can ‘improve their economic capabilities and share the fruits of 
modernisation’ (DDA, 1990: 2). In this context, the second master plan identiied solid 
waste as a hazard that ‘could become a cause of crisis in the Metropolitan life’ (ibid.: 
29), and in subsequent years a twofold strategy evolved to deal with this threat. First, 
waste management was gradually privatized: by 2005 approximately 50% of waste 
management was controlled by private irms (Chaturvedi and Gidwani, 2011). Secondly, 
planners sought to expand the city’s capacity to absorb waste, and the most recent master 
plan called for the construction of four new sanitary landills (DDA, 2010: 29, 31, 111).
As Delhi’s solid waste-management strategy evolved, one constant remained: the 
city’s reliance on the unpaid work of informal-sector labourers who scavenge recyclable 
materials (such as plastic, paper, metal), which they sell to formal and informal-sector 
recyclers (Talyan et al., 2008; Gill, 2010; Gidwani and Maringanti, 2016). Scavenging 
from neighbourhood depots and landills was outlawed in 1957, yet in practice, municipal 
authorities tacitly encouraged informal-sector waste workers who, by 2011, numbered 
between 150,000 and 200,000 (Chaturvedi and Gidwani, 2011). Delhi’s city development 
plan (MUD and IL&FS, 2006: 12–18) concurred, and estimated that 1,200 to 1,500 tonnes 
of waste is recycled daily, as ‘rag-picking of municipal solid waste is widely prevalent 
in Delhi through the involvement of an extensive network of informal (rag-pickers 
and scrap-dealers) and formal (recycling facilities) stakeholders’ (ibid.). The Ministry 
of Environment and Forests (MoEF) oversees waste management throughout India 
and amended the Solid Waste Management Rules in April 2016, calling for the ‘[i]
ntegration of waste pickers/ragpickers and waste dealers/Kabadiwalas in the formal 
system’.1 Delhi’s most recent master plan (2010: 110) noted that the informal sector 
has the potential to ‘reduce the quantum of waste drastically’, and it stated that ‘[the] 
involvement of rag pickers with RWAs, CBOs and NGOs is to be encouraged’.2
1 See http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=138591 (accessed 19 June 2018).
2 The abbreviations in the text stand for resident welfare association, community-based organization and non-
governmental organization, respectively.
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The plan to incorporate informal-sector waste workers into an improved system 
of solid waste management centred on four new sanitary landills was abruptly revised in 
the mid-2000s in favour of a waste-management strategy geared toward the incineration 
of waste. This policy shift was facilitated by a subsidy provided by the CDM, the lagship 
programme that emerged from the Kyoto Protocol in accordance with the UNFCCC. It 
was ostensibly designed to subsidize the transfer of technology that could reduce CO
2
 
emissions from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
to the global South. Projects were issued carbon credits (that is, Certiied Emissions 
Reductions) if they had the potential to reduce CO
2
 emissions and would not take place 
in the absence of CDM approval. There is now consensus that the CDM’s impact on 
CO
2
 emissions in India has been negligible (Schiermeier, 2011). A leaked United States 
State Department cable related conversations between US and Indian oicials, wherein 
the latter stated that irst of all, many projects were approved without oversight, and 
secondly, that if projects were subjected to oversight, they would not have met the 
additionality requirements.3 This was indeed the case with Delhi’s two waste-to-energy 
plants that were registered with the CDM.
For a project to receive CDM approval, its proponents must prove that it will 
result in a net reduction of CO
2
 emissions in comparison with the status quo. This was 
a diicult requirement for the proponents of Delhi’s incinerators to meet, given the 
fact that the informal sector recycles approximately 17.4% of Delhi’s waste (Agarwal 
et al., 2005), thereby diverting it from landills where, if left untreated, it would emit 
greenhouse gasses. The proponents of incinerators needed to, in the words of James 
Scott (1998), render the informal sector ‘illegible’ in order to qualify for carbon credits 
under the CDM. The original project design documents submitted to the CDM credit 
the incinerators with reducing CO
2
 emissions by 262,791 and 111,949 metric tonnes 
per year, respectively. These figures are supported by tables that quantify every 
aspect of the process (for example, coconut shells will apparently be 4.53% of the 
waste processed at one of the plants). The environmental impact of the waste-to-
energy plants is then compared with counter-factual scenarios that are presented 
as business-as-usual, of how waste would be managed if the plants were not built. 
Although multiple scenarios are presented, the continued growth of the informal 
recycling sector is not explored as a possibility because ‘these alternatives are required 
to be in compliance with all applicable legal and regulatory requirements’ (UNFCCC, 
2007: 21). In other words, the project proponents only provided alternative formal 
solutions to solid waste management, and since waste-pickers access waste that legally 
belongs to the state, the informal sector exists in legal limbo and its contribution 
to the management of Delhi’s waste was not recognized. Once the contribution of 
the informal sector had been discounted, the state of waste management in Delhi 
appeared bleak. The proponents of one of the projects claimed that only 53 tonnes of 
Delhi’s waste is treated (ibid.), and the other one stated that a whopping 99% of Delhi’s 
waste is interred in landills (UNFCCC, 2008: 15–16). It went on to conclude that the 
incinerator ‘avoids land illing of 1300 tons of waste per day’ (ibid.: 5), approximately 
the same amount that the informal sector recycles on a daily basis, according to the 
city development plan (as stated above; see also MUD & IL&FS, 2006). The important 
diference is that the waste-to-energy plant will incinerate this waste, while waste-
pickers facilitate its transfer to recyclers.
Waste was hitherto an externality, the management of which was made 
possible by unpaid work of informal-sector recyclers at the ‘back end’ of a commodity 
frontier. The introduction of waste-to-energy plants contributed to the production of 
3 See https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08MUMBAI340_a.html (accessed 19 June 2018). The additionality 
principle mandates that a ‘project must provide emission reductions that are additional to what would otherwise 
have occurred’.
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a commodity frontier in Delhi, as waste became a resource, the incineration of which 
facilitated capital accumulation. The production of this commodity frontier required 
state-led restructuring in accordance with global environmental governance. The 
MoEF granted the quasi-public irm IL&FS clearance to construct a waste-to-energy 
plant on 15 May 2007,4 and in November 2007, IL&FS initiated a process to transfer this 
approval to a private irm. This tender was concluded in January 2008, and the project 
was awarded to Jindal Urban Infrastructure Limited (JUIL). The documents submitted 
for CDM approval fail to explain why the project was transferred to a third party, and 
this is no trivial matter, considering that JUIL’s vice chairman boasted that the company 
expected an 18% to 20% return on its investment (Prasad, 2011).
Burning waste rather than burying it is a ‘fundamentally new [way] of ordering 
the relations between humans and the rest of nature’ (Moore, 2015: 127) that requires 
the implementation of new regulations and the adoption of new technology. These new 
regulations and incineration technology facilitate capital accumulation by putting high-
caloriic waste matter to work. Its incineration powers giant turbines, which generate 
electricity that is sold domestically and carbon credits that are tradable in global 
markets. This requires an uninterrupted supply of waste, the appropriation of which 
amounts to accumulation by ‘brazenly violent’ (Gidwani and Maringanti, 2016: 113) 
dispossession from informal-sector waste workers, whose unpaid labour has hitherto 
been a key component of Delhi’s solid waste-management strategy. Thus the places from 
which high-caloriic waste is sourced (for example, doorsteps, neighbourhood depots 
and retail outlets) have become a commodity frontier characterized by endemic conlict 
between informal-sector waste workers and formal public- and private-sector actors 
who facilitate the low of waste to incinerators (Demaria and Schindler, 2016).
The transition to incineration has been met with resistance from multiple 
quarters. In addition to waste workers whose livelihoods are jeopardized, middle-class 
residents and government oicials have taken aim at various aspects of the projects. 
Government officials at various levels have attempted to assert their authority in 
objection to the ix. The National Green Tribunal (NGT) adjudicates cases that involve 
environmental issues, and it heard a legal challenge against one of the incinerators 
launched by a middle-class resident welfare association. The NGT is a national-level 
court, and the case highlights the tension between municipal authorities and oicials 
in the Indian government. The NGT ordered innumerable tests of ambient air quality, 
reviews of municipal plans for waste collection, and the technology used in one of the 
incinerators. Exasperated by the ad hoc nature of Delhi’s waste-management system, its 
justices ordered the Delhi Chief Secretary ‘to take a meeting of all the Commissioners of 
all the [municipal] Corporations and provide [a] complete and comprehensive solution to 
collect, transport and disposal of municipal solid waste’.5 Nevertheless, the inal verdict 
led to the levying of a small ine on the project proponents for violating environmental 
standards, which amounted to little more than a slap on the wrist. There was also 
conlict between the proponents of the incinerators and the Delhi Electricity Regulatory 
Commission over the price at which the electricity generated would be purchased by 
public utilities. In this case, the NGT ruled in favour of the state, allowing the Delhi 
Electricity Regulatory Commission to simply ix the price in accordance with rules laid 
out by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission. These conlicts demonstrate that 
while the application of new technology and the CDM have indeed produced a localized 
commodity frontier, it remains fragile and if lows of waste are interrupted, the capital 
immobilized in costly incineration technology will be devalorized.
4 The MoEF’s approval letter is available on the project’s page of the UNFCCC website at http://cdm.unfccc.int/
Projects/DB/SGS-UKL1185291186.52/view (accessed 19 June 2018).
5 NGT order of 11 May 2016.
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— Putting rainforests to work for Manaus, Brazil
Public policies in Brazil have sought to abate deforestation in the Amazon for 
decades. In the early twenty-irst century, Amazonas, the largest-area state in the region 
and country, shaped up to become an exemplar of successful rainforest conservation 
combined with rapid economic growth. The state government began implementing 
pioneering schemes for Amazonas’ vast primary forest areas. These sought to leverage 
international ‘carbon credit’ funds for welfare improvements in isolated communities, 
which policy elites began to construe as forest ‘guardians’. Yet this conservationist turn 
did not hamper the continued growth of Manaus, the powerful state capital, which 
exhibits an astonishing level of urban primacy––territorial concentration of economic 
resources and population––within Amazonas. The city of Manaus, which had become 
a competitive industrial location among Brazil’s major metropolitan areas, began 
harbouring ambitions to develop ‘green’ global-city functions based on its unique 
location amid the world’s largest tropical rainforest. This section shows how rainforests 
were ‘put to work’ in unprecedented ways. If rubber-tree exploitation provided capital 
for the city’s initial growth and belle époque splendour in the late nineteenth century, 
the free-zone scheme established in 1967 helped Amazonas to modernize using the 
enclave economy of the city as industrial platform: the leveraging of carbon-sink 
functions, ecosystem services and other natural products from biodiverse rainforests 
promised to support a new era of ecologically oriented prosperity centred on Manaus. 
This green economy offered the potential to harness nature’s unpaid labour more 
proitably and sustainably than cheap yet environmentally destructive activities such 
as logging, cattle ranching and soy cropping. Yet this ambitious eco-scalar ix soon 
exhibited limits, as shown in the analysis that follows. Our analysis, which lists the 
structural contradictions and external factors that have destabilized the arrangement 
in recent years, points to the intensification of uneven development and increased 
inequalities produced by the attempt to commodify and inancialize the carbon stored 
in standing rainforests.
Since the 2000s, Amazonas has become an early subnational adopter of REDD, 
and subsequently of REDD+. Toni (2011) argues that this international funding scheme 
can help promote the decentralization of conservation policy in Brazil, providing 
incentives for subnational units (states and municipalities) to augment their eforts 
against deforestation, and create new locally managed conservation areas. Moreover, 
the state, with the non-governmental Sustainable Amazonas Foundation (Fundação 
Amazonas Sustentável, or FAS) as its flagship institution, has been praised for its 
approach to conservation policy through pioneering pursuit of multi-sectoral 
collaborations with international donors, national institutions, NGOs, science, and local 
communities (Gebara et al., 2014). Among these, Marriott International, a multinational 
corporation in the ield of hospitality with headquarters in the US, provided FAS its most 
high-proile international partnership, which reached a milestone at the 2016 Climate 
Summit of the Americas held in Guadalajara, Mexico. Representatives from FAS and 
the state government presented Marriott an emissions-reduction certiicate, allegedly 
the irst of its kind ever to be issued in Brazil. The partnership supposedly resulted in a 
reduction of 400,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide (t CO
2
) between 2006 and 2013 through 
Marriot’s inancial support of the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve (SDR), a joint 
initiative of FAS and the state government (GCFTF, 2016).
Located in an area of close to 590,000 hectares in the south-eastern quadrant of 
Amazonas state, which is threatened by deforestation owing to its proximity to Rondônia 
state’s agricultural corridor, the Juma SDR plays a paramount role in the state’s eco-
economic strategy. It constitutes a proof of concept for international carbon-credit 
generation, provides a testing site for additional social schemes involving forest peoples, 
and is an iconic signiier of Amazonas’ innovative, cosmopolitan and compassionate 
approach to local conservation and global climate-change mitigation––including 
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the production of globally accessible imagery from inside the SDR (this through a 
partnership between FAS and Google Street View). Beyond FAS-sponsored conservation 
studies, researchers have reached varying conclusions regarding the Juma initiative 
and wider plans for state-level conservation units––Amazonas has created an extensive 
network with 19 million hectares protected across 41 units, several of which, however, 
exhibit much more precarious governance arrangements with the highest levels of 
protected-area deforestation in the entire region (TCE-AM, 2013; Souza, 2017). On the 
positive side, Locatelli et al. (2011) have noted that Juma inserted adaptation concerns 
into what was originally a mitigation project, and emulated policy innovations from the 
federal government by combining payments for ecosystem services with commitment 
from beneficiary families to keep children enrolled in school. The programme’s 
comprehensive development orientation also includes allowances for community 
activities, sustainable micro-enterprise activities and a focus on public health (Viana 
et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, critiques abound regarding laws in the Bolsa Floresta (Forest 
Protection Allowance), the programme that has grown out of the Juma experience to 
include 15 conservation units across the state (Bakkegaard and Wunder, 2014). Rival 
(2012: 13) chronicles that for engaged NGOs, the approach has introduced meagre 
‘welfarism’ into forest communities and a dominant market ideology that commodiies 
carbon and water, thus inhibiting people from pursuing alternative development paths. 
Instead, community leaders demand better access to services and markets for their 
products as well as the ‘bundling’ back together of ecosystem services and human 
labour (see also Gebara, 2013, for participatory shortcomings of the programme’s 
various components). Agustsson et al. (2014) argue that, despite modest current 
reductions in deforestation (within an area where little was occurring in the irst place), 
the programme’s main environmental efects may only materialize in the long term: 
through its indirect impact on improving residents’ knowledge and awareness, and by 
maintaining communities in place to deter deforestation by external actors. Furthermore, 
Juma’s carbon beneits may have been overcalculated owing to leakage (displacement 
of deforestation to other areas) and faulty baseline models that overestimate pressures 
on the sites to be protected (Yanai et al., 2012). Overall, while protected areas, including 
state-level conservation units, may have a role to play in anti-deforestation policy, 
Fearnside (2008) points to the need to coordinate these with the territorial design of 
infrastructure networks (such as roadways), overarching land-use regulations and iscal 
incentives and determents.
In sum, Amazonas’ high-proile/low-investment conservation policies have been 
critiqued for their relative overreliance on international funding to support ‘lagship’ 
projects, the relative unimportance of conservation areas vis-à-vis larger territorial 
interventions with incompatible consequences, and even greenwashing governmental 
neglect of remote forest communities. However, we also need to consider the overall 
political economic context of the state of Amazonas in the early twenty-irst century. 
The overarching concern at this historical conjuncture was to redeine the Manaus Free 
Zone (Zona Franca de Manaus or ZFM). The ZFM federal programme had underpinned 
economic development in the city and state for decades, having been started in Brazil in 
an era of highly regulated import substitution industrialization, and as a counterbalance 
to its territorial focus on the most developed metropolitan regions––which are clustered 
in the country’s southeast. Thus, the protection of rainforest environments can be 
understood as ancillary rather than secondary to the aim of rescuing, restructuring and 
upgrading the city’s economic base (Kanai, 2014a). Following the neoliberalization of 
the Brazilian economy in the 1990s, tax abatements and tarif exemptions had become 
less efective, and new opportunities had to be found in an integrated global economy. 
Thus a new model of accumulation was built upon a possible locational (dis-)advantage 
of Manaus, and its uniqueness amid vast undeveloped rainforests.
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The city might perhaps have leveraged the major role attributed to the Amazon 
region in sustaining the threatened planetary environment (Fearnside, 2008). Yet, 
owing to the high level of dependency that the state economy still exhibited vis-à-vis 
industrial production and employment in the ZFM, the eco-scalar ix necessarily had 
to include this industrial agglomeration as the fulcrum of future growth. In fact, the 
eco-economic policies that the state began to pursue were overlaid on, and shaped 
by, earlier eforts by multiple actors to shore up Manaus’ industrial district after the 
abrupt decline it had experienced in the early 1990s. Further corporate beneits and 
exemptions to incentivize industrial relocation; support of science and technology to 
stimulate industrial restructuring and investments in research and development; and 
public investments in urban and regional infrastructure to improve the city’s built 
environment and enhance its external connectivity were all part of the initial package 
of transformative state actions (Pereira, 2006). Green initiatives were meant to diversify 
the local economy and increase the value added to the restructured economic base, 
and such initiatives would also contribute to Brazil’s quest for global recognition as an 
international environmental leader. Thus, in 2003, the federal government built the 
massive Centro de Biotecnologia da Amazônia (or CBA, the Amazon Biotechnology 
Centre) in Manaus, as part of its multi-year investment plan, called PROBEM (Programa 
Brasileiro de Ecologia Molecular para o Uso Sustentável da Biodiversidade, or the 
Brazilian Programme for Molecular Ecology for the Sustainable use of Biodiversity). 
In the same year, the first high-profile Amazonas state programme for sustainable 
development was unveiled, tellingly named the Green Free Zone (Zona Franca Verde, or 
ZFV), to promote development in the state’s remote communities while strengthening 
conservation initiatives and the protection of biodiversity. Prominently supporting the 
ZFV was governor Eduardo Braga (2002–2010), a reformist politician under whose 
leadership FAS was created as an independent NGO (outside state government structures 
to avoid political interference), and the irst state law to regulate climate-change policies 
was passed, allowing the Amazonas government to engage in international carbon 
trading (Becker and Stenner, 2008).
The stated policy goal was to broaden the economic base away from industrial 
manufacturing, and to support the growth of green industries within a sustainable 
development framework. Yet the brunt of state initiatives and new investments 
remained territorially concentrated in and around Manaus. The various plans and 
programmes put in place either focused on upgrading the urban core to support more 
advanced and proitable activities, or on expanding the metropolitan area by extending 
the provision of services and basic infrastructure. In terms of the former, PROSAMIM 
(Programa Social e Ambiental dos Igarapés de Manaus, or the Manaus Waterways and 
Environmental Programme) was the first high-profile intervention that was rolled 
out. This creek restoration programme, in fact, refers to the piping and paving over 
of many of the city’s central waterways. More controversially, PROSAMIM displaced 
resident populations to peripheral locations, where they were ofered access to formal 
housing. Additionally, the successful bid to host matches during the FIFA World Cup 
2014 resulted in several large-scale initiatives and investments to distinguish Manaus as 
the ‘green’ host city (Kanai, 2014a). While several of these are still to materialize, such 
as the sustainable mobility scheme, Amazonas state built one of the most expensive and 
technologically sophisticated stadia in Brazil, which was awarded a LEED certiication.6 
In terms of the latter, the state established a top-down framework to govern investments 
in the metropolitan region, and built the irst (mega-)bridge over a main tributary to 
the Amazon River, thereby linking Manaus to the south bank region. This opened up 
erstwhile rural municipalities to accommodate growth overlow from Manaus (Kanai, 
2014b). The more recent, currently stalled, initiative to build a ‘university city’ in a 
6 The acronym LEED stands for Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design.
SCHINDLER AND KANAI 840
greenield area of Iranduba exempliies the territorial expansion aims: in addition to 
educational facilities, the area was slated to accommodate spaces for life-sciences and 
biotechnological research, and clean industrial production, as well as high-end housing, 
retail and recreational sectors, all overlaid on protected forest areas that were to be 
turned into premium green amenities.
In recent years, Amazonas’ eco-economic schemes have been reduced to a more 
conventional form of ecologically themed city-regional entrepreneurialism intent on 
attracting foreign investment and linking local activities to transnational circuits of 
capital (Kanai, 2014a). Technological bottlenecks have impeded the growth of local 
bio-industries, and foreign investments in rainforest conservation have been lower than 
initially expected in the context of ongoing international problems to set global markets 
for carbon and ecosystem services. Instead, speculation has abounded, particularly in 
the Manaus real-estate sector, triggering rapid land appreciation (ibid.). Furthermore, 
whereas industrial production continued growing rapidly under the ZFM scheme, 
and certain quarters developed advanced urban functions in the 2000s, particularly 
related to specialized consumption and high-value residential land use, economic 
beneits did not spread widely in Amazonas. The increasingly unbalanced economic 
dynamics have led to the continuation of in-migration from the hinterlands. Socio-
ecological conlicts have increased in periurban areas, where informal urbanization is 
met with strengthened conservation enforcement, but also in the urban core, where the 
working and middle classes increasingly protest the contradictions of ‘environmental’ 
building projects that result in high levels of pollution, vulnerabilities and deicient 
support infrastructures in their everyday lives. Furthermore, the infrastructure 
networks developed to sustain Manaus’ metropolitan growth have had the unintended 
consequence of enabling deforestation activity. The paving of the BR-174 roadway that 
links the city to the extensive roadway network and coastal ports of Venezuela was 
meant to enhance surface connectivity for industrial products and passenger traic, 
but is also used by illegal loggers. Similar dynamics plague energy projects such as the 
Coari–Manaus gas pipeline, which puts in evidence the limitations of protected-area 
conservation schemes within an overall development approach that disregards the 
deforestation implications of infrastructure and industrial policy (Kanai, 2014b; 2016).
In the 2010s, deforestation increased amid a national recession and a rollback 
of forest protection in Brazil (Souza, 2016). The territorially extensive eco-scalar ix 
set up in Amazonas, with metropolitan Manaus at its core, is further threatened by the 
recent notable decline of industrial production. The ZFM has proven highly sensitive 
to reductions in domestic consumption, given the model’s failure to develop substantial 
export markets outside Brazil (Paiva, 2015). With less funds to support conservation 
agencies, slashed-and-burned rainforests increasingly have an adverse efect on air 
quality in the city. Politically discontented populations increasingly feel the burden of 
economic slowdown, and an ongoing legitimacy crisis was triggered by high-proile 
corruption cases, leading to elected oicials being forcefully deposed. Local institutions 
and stakeholders are exploring new alternatives for the failing development model. Yet 
there is uncertainty about the right ‘ix’ to appropriate higher values from rainforests. 
Concerns abound regarding the possibility of protecting standing forests to a degree 
that will not imperil regional and global climate dynamics further, as Amazonas shows 
signs of being unable to green its development model and reduce deforestation-related 
carbon emissions beyond speculative inancing.
Conclusion: localized commodity frontiers, uneven development and  
inter-city connectivity
Jason Moore’s world-ecological analysis of capitalism highlights its dependence 
on the availability of Cheap Nature, which has historically been generated by 
appropriating resources on recently opened commodity frontiers. As these resources 
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are accounted for and commodiied, their reproduction constitutes a cost which, over 
time, will inhibit capital accumulation. The history of capitalism is one of constant 
expansion beyond successive commodity frontiers, in a relentless quest to maintain 
a favourable ratio of accumulated/commodiied nature. Moore argues that the crisis 
of contemporary capitalism is terminal, because there are no ‘great’ commodity 
frontiers whose transgression would restore the production of Cheap Nature and fuel 
an expansionary phase of global capitalism. In this article, we have shown that in the 
absence of a ‘great’ frontier, multi-scalar growth coalitions have sought to identify, 
produce and transgress localized commodity frontiers. These eco-scalar fixes are 
achieved by combining expertise and capital situated at the global scale with powerful 
locally embedded actors, whose intimate knowledge of places allows them to identify 
resources that have hitherto remained non-commodiied and can be leveraged in a 
global carbon economy. While some of these commodity frontiers are geared toward 
the extraction of material resources, such as the transformation of municipal solid 
waste into refuse-derived fuel, others rely on global governance frameworks to produce 
ictitious commodities such as ‘carbon credits’, awarded for rainforest conservation. We 
presented two case studies of city-oriented eco-scalar ixes from diferent segments of 
the carbon cycle, and in both instances conditions favourable to capital accumulation for 
some stakeholders were restored at least temporarily. In the case of Delhi, authorities 
engineered an ‘intensive’ eco-scalar ix by introducing waste-to-energy technology that 
allowed capital to appropriate the unpaid labour of nature through the incineration 
of waste and subsequent generation of tradable carbon credits. The ‘extensive’ eco-
scalar ix in Manaus, by contrast, was predicated on exerting control over rainforest 
hinterlands, the conservation of which generated inancial/symbolic resources. Taken 
together, these case studies demonstrate that global environmental governance 
frameworks––and particularly those associated with carbon control––serve to produce 
Cheap Nature in various ways, such as through the adoption of new technology and laws, 
the territorial expansion of extractive activity, or a combination thereof. This explains 
why eco-scalar ixes are occurring in a broad range of geographical contexts and with 
variegated empirical manifestations in terms of modalities and tactics.
The ability of these regimes to sustain capital accumulation relies on maintaining 
a steady stream of appropriated––rather than commodiied––resources, which is the 
basis for producing Cheap Nature (Moore, 2015). This requires unceasing eforts to 
dispossess those who have historically used non-commodiied resources. Marginalized 
populations bear the brunt of this unrelenting primitive accumulation, and this explains 
the ‘increasing numbers of ecological distribution conlicts that sometimes overlap 
with other social conlicts related to class, ethnicity or indigenous identity, gender or 
caste and which may be further related to institutional conigurations such as property 
regimes or territorial rights’ (Martinez-Alier et al., 2016: 732). These conlicts have the 
potential to disrupt the appropriation of resources and call into question the durability 
of the regimes of accumulation achieved by eco-scalar ixes. For example, one of Delhi’s 
waste-to-energy plants was challenged in court by nearby residents and, although 
this bid was ultimately unsuccessful, it posed a major risk to the project’s investors, 
as it threatened to devalorize capital already immobilized in costly waste-to-energy 
technology. Indeed, as the search for remaining non-commodiied resources intensiies, 
investors will be forced to territorialize capital in increasingly risky locales and ventures. 
In instances where capital is devalued, the question will be whether the loss is borne 
by private-sector irms, municipal authorities or global investors. This adds a scalar 
dimension to the classic version of entrepreneurial urbanism in which the public sector 
assumes the risk while the private sector reaps the inancial rewards (see Harvey, 1989).
In closing, we have attempted to show how multi-scalar coalitions mobilized 
global governance frameworks to produce localized commodity frontiers in diferent 
segments of the carbon cycle. However, we need to clarify that this article’s engagement 
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with eco-scalar ixes does not exhaust all the dimensions of the geographies of the 
end of Cheap Nature that should be investigated. In particular, there is an apparent 
intensiication of attempts to expand city-based infrastructure networks into heretofore 
peripheral resource-rich areas (Enns, 2018), as policymakers at multiple scales seek to 
integrate vast tracts of non-urban land into planned networks of human settlements 
(Zoomers et al., 2017). UN-Habitat’s (2016) New Urban Agenda, which was ratiied 
by UN member states, airmed the intention of national governments to plan national 
urban systems and infrastructure development. To assist national urban planners 
UN-Habitat (2015) released the International Guidelines on Urban and Territorial 
Planning, which advocates territorial planning at multiple scales and establishes ‘general 
rules and mechanisms for coordinated inter-municipal urban and territorial planning 
and management’ (UN-Habitat, 2015: 9). These plans represent a state-orchestrated 
commitment to the production and transgression of localized commodity frontiers 
under conditions of recentralized political power. This has the potential to intensify 
uneven development as some peripheral areas are ‘plugged in’ to global circuits of capital 
and others are bypassed (Murray, 2017; Kanai and Schindler, 2018). Therefore, future 
research should not only focus on the prospects of global capitalism’s decarbonization, 
and the impact of producing localized commodity frontiers: we should also attend to 
the actors engaged, the modalities of activities and the (increasingly urban) geographies 
that are subject to transformation. Alongside speculative ixes, socio-ecological impacts 
and politicized resistances loom large in the uneven and contested landscapes at the end 
of Cheap Nature.
Seth Schindler, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, Arthur Lewis 
Building, Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK, seth.schindler@manchester.ac.uk
J. Miguel Kanai, Department of Geography, University of Shefield, Firth Court, 
Shefield, S10 2TN, UK, miguel.kanai@shefield.ac.uk
References
Agarwal A., A. Singhmar, M. Kulshrestha and A. Mittal 
(2005) Municipal solid waste recycling and associated 
markets in Delhi, India. Resources, Conservation and 
Recycling 44.1, 73–90.
Agustsson, K., A. Garibjana, E. Rojas and A. Vatn (2014) An 
assessment of the forest allowance programme in 
the Juma Sustainable Development Reserve in Brazil. 
International Forestry Review 16.1, 87–102.
Arrighi, G. ([1994] 2006) The long twentieth century. Verso, 
New York, NY.
Bakkegaard, R.K. and S. Wunder (2014) Bolsa Floresta, 
Brazil. In E.O. Sills (ed.), REDD+ on the ground: a 
case book of subnational initiatives across the globe, 
Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor 
Barat.
Bayirbağ, M. (2010) Local entrepreneurialism and state 
rescaling in Turkey. Urban Studies 47.2, 363–85.
Becker, B. and C. Stenner (2008) Um futuro para Amazônia 
[A future for the Amazon region]. Oicina de Textos, 
São Paulo.
Betsill, M.M. and H. Bulkeley (2006) Cities and the multilevel 
governance of global climate change. Global 
Governance 12.2, 141–59.
Böhm, S., M.C. Misoczky and S. Moog (2012) Greening 
capitalism? A Marxist critique of carbon markets. 
Organization Studies 33.11, 1617–38.
Bond, P. (2012) Emissions trading, new enclosures and eco-
social contestation. Antipode 44.3, 684–701.
Boyd E., M. Boykoff and P. Newell (2011) The ‘new’ 
carbon economy: What’s new? Antipode 43.3, 
601–11.
Brenner, N. (1998) Between ixity and motion: accumulation, 
territorial organization and the historical geography 
of spatial scales. Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space 16.4, 459–81.
Bridge, G. (2011) Resource geographies 1: making 
carbon economies, old and new. Progress in Human 
Geography 35.6, 820–34.
Bulkeley, H. and V.C. Broto (2012) Government by 
experiment? Global cities and the governing of 
climate change. Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 38.3, 361–75.
Carmin, J., I. Anguelovski and D. Roberts (2012) Urban 
climate adaptation in the global South: planning 
in an emerging policy domain. Journal of Planning 
Education and Research 32.1, 18–32.
Castree, N. and B. Christophers (2015) Banking spatially 
on the future: capital switching, infrastructure and the 
ecological ix. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 105.2, 378–86.
Chaturvedi, B. and V. Gidwani (2011) The right to waste: 
informal sector recyclers and struggles for social 
justice in post-reform urban India. In W. Ahmed,  
A. Kundu and R. Peet (eds.), India’s new economic 
policy: a critical analysis, Routledge, New York, NY.
Cohen, A. and K. Bakker (2014) The eco-scalar ix: rescaling 
environmental governance and the politics of 
ecological boundaries in Alberta, Canada. Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space 32.1, 128–46.
Cohen, A. and J. McCarthy (2015) Reviewing rescaling: 
strengthening the case for environmental 
considerations. Progress in Human Geography 39.1, 
3–25.
DDA (Delhi Development Authority) (1962) Delhi Master 
Plan, 1962. Akalank Publications, New Delhi.
DDA (Delhi Development Authority) (1990) Master Plan for 
Delhi 2001. Akalank Publications, New Delhi.
DDA (Delhi Development Authority) (2010) Master Plan for 
Delhi 2021 (as amended up to 15th October 2009). 
V.K. Puri, New Delhi.
PRODUCING LOCALIZED COMMODITY FRONTIERS AT THE END OF CHEAP NATURE 843
Demaria, F. and S. Schindler (2016) Contesting urban 
metabolism: struggles over waste-to-energy in Delhi, 
India. Antipode 48.2, 293–313.
Ekers, M. and S. Prudham (2015) Towards the socio-
ecological ix. Environment and Planning A: Economy 
and Space 47.12, 2438–45.
Ekers, M. and S. Prudham (2017) The metabolism of 
socioecological ixes: capital switching, spatial ixes, 
and the production of nature. Annals of the American 
Association of Geographers 107.6, 1370–88.
Enns, C. (2018) Mobilizing research on Africa’s development 
corridors. Geoforum 88 (January), 105–8.
Fearnside, P. (2008) Amazon forest maintenance as a 
source of environmental services. Anais da Academia 
Brasileira de Ciências 80.1, 101–14.
Federici, S. (2014) Caliban and the witch: women, the body 
and primitive accumulation. Autonomedia, New York, NY.
Fuchs, R., M. Conran and E. Louis (2011) Climate change 
and Asia’s coastal urban cities: can they meet the 
challenge? Environment and Urbanization Asia 2.1, 
13–28.
GCFTF (Governors’ Climate and Forests Task Force) 
(2016) Amazonas-FAS-Marriott Certiicate. 15 
September [WWW document]. URL https://gcftf.org/
news/2017/5/17/amazonas-fas-marriott-certiicate 
(accessed 20 July 2017).
Gebara, M.F. (2013) Importance of local participation in 
achieving equity in beneit-sharing mechanisms for 
REDD+: a case study from the Juma Sustainable 
Development Reserve. International Journal of the 
Commons 7.2, 473–97.
Gebara, M.F., L. Fatorelli, P. May and S. Zhang (2014) REDD+ 
policy networks in Brazil: constraints and opportunities 
for successful policy making. Ecology and Society 19.3, 
Art. 53.
Gidwani, V. and A. Maringanti (2016) The waste–value 
dialectic: lumpen urbanization in contemporary India. 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East 36.1, 112–33.
Gill, K. (2010) Of poverty and plastic: scavenging and 
scrap trading entrepreneurs in India’s urban informal 
economy. Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Harvey, D. (1989) From managerialism to 
entrepreneurialism: the transformation of urban 
politics in late capitalism. Geografiska Annaler 71.1, 
3–17.
Jonas, A., D. Gibbs and A. While (2011) The new urban 
politics as a politics of carbon control. Urban Studies 
48.12, 2537–54.
Kanai, J.M. (2014a) Capital of the Amazon rainforest: 
constructing a global city-region for entrepreneurial 
Manaus. Urban Studies 51.11, 2387–405.
Kanai, J.M. (2014b) On the peripheries of planetary 
urbanization: globalizing Manaus and its expanding 
impact. Environment and Planning D: Society and 
Space 32.6, 1071–87.
Kanai, J.M. (2016) The pervasiveness of neoliberal territorial 
design: cross-border infrastructure planning in South 
America since the introduction of IIRSA. Geoforum 69 
(February), 160–70.
Kanai, J.M. and R. da Silva Oliveira (2014) Paving 
(through) Amazonia: neoliberal urbanism and the 
reperipheralization of Roraima. Environment and 
Planning A: Economy and Space 46.1, 62–77.
Kanai, M. and S. Schindler (2018) Peri-urban promises of 
connectivity: linking project-led polycentrism to the 
infrastructure scramble. Environment and Planning A: 
Economy and Space. https://doi.org/10.1177/03085
18X18763370
Kirkpatrick, L.O. and M.P. Smith (2011) The infrastructural 
limits to growth: rethinking the urban growth machine 
in times of iscal crisis. International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research 35.3, 477–503.
Lawhon, M., H. Ernstson and J. Silver (2014) Provincializing 
urban political ecology: towards a situated UPE 
through African urbanism. Antipode 46.2, 497–516.
Locatelli, B., V. Evans, A. Wardell, A. Andrade and R. Vignola 
(2011) Forests and climate change in Latin America: 
linking adaptation and mitigation. Forests 2.1, 431–50.
Loftus, A. and H. March (2016) Financializing desalination: 
rethinking the returns of big infrastructure. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
40.1, 46–61.
Martinez-Alier, J., L. Temper, D. del Bene and A. Scheidel 
(2016) Is there a global environmental justice 
movement? The Journal of Peasant Studies 43.3, 
731–55.
Marx, K. ([1876] 1990) Capital. Penguin Classics, New York, 
NY.
McCarthy, J. (2015) A socioecological ix to capitalist crisis 
and climate change? The possibilities and limits of 
renewable energy. Environment and Planning A: 
Economy and Space 47.12, 2485–502.
MCD (Municipal Corporation of Delhi) (1957) The Delhi 
Municipal Corporation Act [WWW document]. URL 
http://www.mcdonline.gov.in/tri/ndmc_mcdportal/
publications/DMC%20Act.v.11..pdf (accessed 19 June 
2018).
Moore, J. (2000) Environmental crises and the metabolic 
rift in world-historical perspective. Organization & 
Environment 13.2, 123–57.
Moore, J. (2011) Transcending the metabolic rift: a theory 
of crises in the capitalist world-ecology. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 38.1, 1–46.
Moore, J. (2015) Capitalism in the web of life: ecology and 
the accumulation of capital. Verso, New York, NY.
MUD and IL&FS (2006) City development plan: Delhi. 
Ministry of Urban Development and IL&FS Ecosmart 
Limited, Delhi.
Murray, M. (2017) The urbanism of exception: the dynamics 
of global city building in the twenty-first century. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Nugent, J.P. (2015) Ontario’s infrastructure boom: a 
socioecological ix for air pollution, congestion, jobs, 
and proits. Environment and Planning A: Economy and 
Space 47.12, 2465–84.
Paiva, B. (2015) Crise econômica afeta produção da Zona 
Franca de Manaus [The economic crisis affects 
production in the Manaus Free Zone]. Empresa Brasil 
de Comunicação 28 December [WWW document]. 
URL http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/
noticia/2015-12/crise-economica-afeta-producao-da-
zona-franca-de-manaus (accessed 20 July 2017).
Parnell, S., D. Simon and C. Vogel (2007) Global 
environmental change: conceptualizing the growing 
challenge for cities in poor countries. Area 39.3, 
357–69.
Pereira, D. (2006) Amazônia insustentável: Zona Franca de 
Manaus: estudo e análise [The unsustainable Amazon: 
Manaus Free Zone: research and analysis]. Valer, 
Manaus.
Prasad, A. (2011) Trashing in. Fortune India 5 June [WWW 
document]. URL http://fortuneindia.com/2011/june/
trashing-in-1.7882 (accessed 24 July 2017).
Rival, L. (2012) Sustainable development through policy 
integration in Latin America: a comparative approach. 
Social Dimensions of Green Economy and Sustainable 
Development Occasional Papers, United Nations 
Institute for Social Development/Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung [WWW document]. URL https://www.iles.ethz.
ch/isn/142048/7%20Rival-web.pdf (accessed 20 July 
2017).
Schiermeier, Q. (2011) Clean-energy credits tarnished: 
WikiLeaks reveals that most Indian claims are 
ineligible. Nature 477, 517–18.
Schindler, S. (2016) Detroit after bankruptcy: a case of 
degrowth machine politics. Urban Studies 53.4, 
818–36.
Schindler, S. and B. Kishore (2015) Why Delhi cannot plan 
its ‘new towns’: the case of solid waste management in 
Noida. Geoforum 60 (March), 33–42.
Schindler, S., F. Demaria and S. Pandit (2012) Delhi’s waste 
conlict. Economic and Political Weekly 47.42, 18–21.
Scott, J. (1998) Seeing like a state: how certain schemes 
to improve the human condition have failed. Yale 
University Press, New Haven, CT.
Smith ([1984] 2010) Uneven development: nature, capital, 
and the production of space. Verso, New York, NY.
SCHINDLER AND KANAI 844
Souza, S. (2016) Amazonas chama atenção pelo aumento da 
taxa de desmatamento [The rising deforestation rates 
of Amazonas state stand out]. A Critica 8 December 
[WWW document]. URL http://www.acritica.com/
channels/governo/news/de-heroi-da-preservacao-a-
vilao-do-desmatamento (accessed 20 July 2017).
Souza, S. (2017) Amazonas tem cinco unidades de 
conservação no ranking das 50 UCs mais desmatadas 
[Five conservation units in Amazonas state among the 





(accessed 20 July 2017).
Talyan, V., R.P. Dahiya and T.R. Sreekrishnan (2008) State 
of municipal solid waste management in Delhi, the 
capital of India. Waste Management 28.7, 1276–87.
TCE-AM (Tribunal de Contas do Estado do Amazonas) 
(2013) TCE identiica 31 problemas em unidades 
de conservação do AM [State Audit Ofice inds 31 
problems in the conservation units of Amazonas state]. 
Auditorias 1 November [WWW document]. URL http://
www.tce.am.gov.br/portal/?p=8848 (accessed 20 July 
2017).
Toni, F. (2011) Decentralization and REDD+ in Brazil. Forests 
2.1, 66–85.
Torrance, M. (2008) Forging glocal governance? Urban 
infrastructures as networked inancial products. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 
32.1, 1–21.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) (2007) The Timarpur-Okhla Waste 
Management Company Pvt Ltd’s (TOWMCL) integrated 
waste to energy project at Delhi. CDM Executive Board, 
Bonn.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change) (2008) Integrated municipal waste 
processing complex at Ghazipur, Delhi. CDM Executive 
Board, Bonn.
UN-Habitat (2015) International guidelines on urban and 
territorial planning. UN-Habitat, Nairobi.
UN-Habitat (2016) New urban agenda. UN-Habitat, Nairobi.
Viana, V., M. Cenamo, G. Ribenboim, J. Tezza and M. Pavan 
(2008) Juma Sustainable Development Reserve: the 
irst REDD project in the Brazilian Amazon. Fundação 
Amazonas Sustentável, Manaus.
While, A., A. Jonas and D. Gibbs (2010) From sustainable 
development to carbon control: eco-state restructuring 
and the politics of urban and regional development. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 
35.1, 76–93.
Yanai, A.M., P.M. Fearnside, P.M.L. de Alencastro Graça 
and E.M. Nogueira (2012) Avoided deforestation in 
Brazilian Amazonia: simulating the effect of the Juma 
Sustainable Development Reserve. Forest Ecology and 
Management 282 (October), 78–91.
Zoomers, A., F. van Noorloos, K. Otsuki, G. Steel and G. van 
Westen (2017) The rush for land in an urbanizing 
world: from land grabbing toward developing safe, 
resilient, and sustainable cities and landscapes. World 
Development 92 (April), 242–52.
